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The paper analyses strategic behaviour in international trade in a
macroeconomic setting. The microeconomic foundations are discussed first.
Consumers face a two-stage decision problem, but the intertemporal aspects
of the problem are left out of consideration. Profit maximizing firms
behave as discriminating monopolists, driving a wedge between the real
exchange rate and the relative price of products in a two-country, two-
commodity world. Assuming equilibrium in both labour markets and both
product markets the outcomes under imperfect competition and under perfect
competition are compared. Applying a log-linear version of the model the
impact of different shocks is derived analytically.1
A Macroeconomic Two-Country Model with Price-discriminating Monopolists
by
Th. van de Klundert~)
1. Introduction
Monopolistic competition has gained a renewed interest in economic
theory. In the macroeconomíc field the question is asked whether monopo-
listic competition introduces Keynesian features into the model because
firms face a demand constraint (e.g., Hart, 1982; Akerlof and Yellen,
1985; Blanchard and Kiyotaki, 1985; Van de Klundert and Peters, 1987). In
the theory of international trade imperfect competition is applied to
explain intrasectoral trade along with intersectoral trade (e.g., Dixit
and Norman, 1980; Helpman, 1984; Krugman, 1985; Venables, 1985). As such
these models are helpful in understanding the consequences of world-wide
competition in specific commodity markets.
The present paper introduces price-discríminating monopolists in a
two-country macroeconomic model. The basic idea is considered in a seminal
paper by Branson and Rotemberg (1980), but the microeconomic foundations
of their model are not fully developped. As will be argued, this leads to
some confusion with regard to the role of relative commodity prices and
terms of trade. Price-discriminating monopolists drive a wedge between the
real exchange rate (terms of trade) and relative consumers' prices. The
consequences of such a divergence need to be carefuliy analysed.
The two-country macroeconomic model which serves here as a frame-
work for the analysis of monopolistic competition is in the spirit of
equilibrium models as studied among others by Lipton and Sachs (1983).
Buiter (1984), Van de Klundert (1986), Attanasio and Van der Ploeg (198~).
It may be of interest to compare the solutions of the model under diffe-
rent market structures. In addition, the more practical question iay be
asked in which way monopolistic competition determines the impact of
M
)I am indebted to J. Frijns, R. de Groof, S. Kuipers, F, van der Ploeg,
V. Okker and A. van Schaik for useful comments on an earlier draft. The
usual disclaimer of course applies.2
shocks emanating from the demand side or the supply side of the economy.
Import competition seems to a large extent price competition, which may
have far reaching consequences. As stated by a group of economists in a
Report for the EEC: "To think about the issue of import competition, one
must relax the assumption of perfect competition in product markets. We
can think of the problem most easily in terms of monopolistic competition,
where each firm's demand depends on aggregate demand and the firm's price
relative to the industry average. Import competition here simply takes the
form of a reduction in the industry-wide price because the import segment
of the industry price falls. All domestic firms face an inward shift of
their demand curve. They react by contracting output and employment"
(Blanchard, et. al., 1985, pp. 12-13). As this view may be influential-
ly, it may be worthwile to scrutinize these and associated ideas by apply-
ing a more formal mode of analysis.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 the microeconomic
foundations of the model are given proper attention. Consumer behaviour is
studied in section 2.1, while firm behaviour is examined in section 2.2.
Applying these results a two-country macroeconomic equilibrium model is
presented in section 3.1. Some differences between perfect and imperfect
competition are reported in this section. Further results are obtained by
a comparative static analysis. For this purpose a log-linear version of
the model is presented in section 3.2. The impact of supply and demand
shocks is analysed by solving this log-linear version in section 3.3. The
paper closes with some conclusions.
2. Microfoundations of the model
2.1 Consumer behaviour
Consumers have to decide how much they will spend in the current
period and how they will distribute that amount over the different commo-
dities in the market. It will be assumed that both decisions are separabie
and that the first decision has already been made. The amount to be spend
on different commodities (cpc) is therefore known. The consumption menu3
consists of m domestic goods and m- foreign goods. Domestic goods are
produced under identical conditions implying that they can be aggregated.
The domestic country specializes ín the commodity indicated by the sub-
cript 1. Total consumptíon of this commodity at home is denoted by cl. The
foreign country specializes in commodity tvo. All foreign goods are also
produced under the same technological conditions. Total demand for this
commodity at home (import) is denoted by c2. The elasticity of substitu-
tion (~) between each pair of goods irrespective of their origin is the
same, greater than one, and constant. The utility-index may then be writ-
ten as:
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Dividing through by (mtmr)n-1 the utility-index u is transformed into:
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(2.1.2)
The representative consumer in the domestic country chooses cl and
c2 to maximize utility u subject to the budget constraint
cpc - clpl t c2p2 , (2.1.3)
where pl denotes the price of the domestic good and p2 denotes the price
of the foreign or imported good. The first order conditions for a maximum
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is the ideal definition of the general price-index.
The corresponding equations in the foreign country, where we
cate variables with an asteriks, read
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It should be observed that there are m domestic goods and m imported
goods in the foreign country assuming the same consumption menu in both
regions.
2.2 Firm behaviour
Following Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) each product is associated
with a single firm, which sets the price of its specific commodity. The
number of firms is sufficiently large and each firm ignores the effect of
its actions on the general price level. There is a sítuation of monopolis-
tic competition. However, the markets at home and abroad are separated
which opens the possibility of price discrimination. As in Branson and
Rotemberg (1980} we therefore postulate that the representative firm in
each country behaves as a discriminating monopolist, charging different
prices at home and abroad. The production function is f(~), with f~(~C) C 0
MÍ -i
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and ~ denoting labour input. Profit maximization of domestic firms can
then be formulated as
N N
max: rt N- Plcl t Plcl - w.~
{cl,cl}
s.t. cl ; cl - f(~) ,
(2.2.1)
(2.2.2)
where w denotes the nominal wage rate. Substitution of the inverted demand
equations according to (2.1.4), (2.1.8) and equation (2.2.2) in the profit
relationship gives:
1 1 1 lr 1-1:
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Maximization of equation (2.2.1a) results after some manipulation in the
following first order conditions:
~ pl f~(,~) - w
M




The corresponding equations for the foreign discriminating monopo-
list can now be written as
N
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(2.2.51
(2.2.6)
Under perfect competition equations (2.2.3) -(2.2.6) come down to
the familiar equality of the real wage rate and the marginal product of
labour. Under monopolistic competition firms realize a profit margin,6
which differs on internationally segmented markets.l) From equations
(2-2.3) -(2.2.6) the following result can be obtained:
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it appears that the relative price consumers face is the same in both
countries. The terms of trade of the domestic country (real exchange rate)
r
P
are equal to P1, whereas the reciprocal indicates the terms of trade of
2
. N
the foreign country. For 1 C~, ( n(and therefore ~(~) we have
. M
pl pl P1 p2
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This result leads to the following proposition.
(2.2.9)
Proposition 1. The terms of trade of the country where monopolistic compe-
tition is relatively weaker, because products are more homogeneous than in
the other country, exceed the price ratio consumers are facinR at home and
abroad.
That is all to be said in a partial equilibrium setting. To determine the
relative price of both goods we have to specify a general equilibrium
model. This will be our task in the next section.
-------------------------------------------------------
1) Branson and Rotemberg (1980) erroneously assume that under monopolis-
tic competition the foreign price level enters the demand function for
labour in the domestic country and vice versa for the other region.7
3. A macroeconomíc two-countrY model
3.1 ~ecification of the model
General equilibrium in a two-country model of the format presented
in section 2 requires simultaneous equilibrium in four markets: two goods
markets and two labour markets. However, there are only three relative
prices to do the job, i.e. the real wage rate in both countries and the
relative price of commodities one and two. In the theory of international
trade it is usual to assume that all income accruing from production is
spent on commodities. For the domestic country this would mean:
w w
clpl ~ clpl - clpl ~ c2p2' ~e current account balances and one could
invoke Walras' law to eliminate one of the equations requiring equilibrium
in the goods market. The number of equations then corresponds to the num-
ber of unknown variables.
In macroeconomic theory one would allow for disequilibrium on the
current account. Indeed, the notion of intertemporal choice refers to
borrowing and lending, which could take the form of international capital
movements. Assuming perfect capital mobility the real interest rate would
be uniform across countries. If spending would depend on the interest rate
there would be an additional variable to equilibrate both goods markets.
In a number of macroeconomic two-country models the demand for investment
goods is supposed to be a function of the real interest rate (e.g. Lipton
and Sachs, 1983; Buiter, 1984; Van de Klundert, 1986; Attanasio and Van
der Ploeg, 1987). Here, we shall assume that total consumption in both
regions depends negatively on the real rate of interest.
c- c(r;c) , ár C 0
.
c~ - c~(r;cM) , ár ~ 0 (3.1.2)
The symbols c and c. indicate sutonomous factors or shift varia-
bles in the demand equations. Wealth effects (including gains and losses
in the terms of trade) are omitted to make the analysis more tractable.
This may be done without causing any serious problem.
Equilibrium in the market for goods can be formulated as8
r
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(3.1.3)
(3.1.4)
The supply of labour may be positively related to the real wage
rate, which can be written as
d~
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Here also, the symbols ~s ,,is indicate shift variables. In equilibrium
labour supply equals labour demand, which can be expressed formally as
~ - i
s




The complete model consists of 18 equations: (2.1.4)-(2.1.9),








viz. cl,cl, c2,c2, c,c~, ,~,,~~, .~s,,ts, 1, 1 2~ 2
M~ Ár
Pc Pc Pc pc
Real wage rigidity and labour market disequilibrium can be intro-
duced in a straightforward manner. Nominal wage regidity would also be a
possibility after the introduction of a monetary sector. However, employ-
ment problems are not our primary concern. We will therefore stick to the
equilibrium version of the model and compare the situation of monopolistic
competition with that of perfect competition.
It is easy to proof the following result.9
Proposition 2. If labour supply is exogenous the countrv where monopolis-
tic competition is relativelv weaker realizes higher terms of trade than
under perfect competition.
This proposition follows from proposition 1 and the fact that with exoge-
nous labour supply the relative price consumers face is independent of the
P
market structure. The relative price P1 which is equal to the terms of
2
trade under perfect competition, follows in this case from equations
(2.1.4)-(2.1.9) and (3.1.3)-(3.1.4).
With endogenous labour supply this result does not hold. The solu-
tion of the model is then more complicated and linearization around an
equilibrium solution will be helpful to obtain further results.
3.2 The log-linear version of the model
Indicating percentage deviations by a dot above the variable the
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To make the model more tractable we assume that both regions have
a number of structural characteristics in common in the steady state befo-
re the model is exposed to shocks, i .e. p-p~, E-E~, L-L~ and g-~r. To
compare the outcomes under monopolistic competition with the results under
perfect competition we may proceed as follows. Under perfect competition r
we have ~-; -1. Monopolistic competition may be seen as a perturbation of
the system under perfect competition, which takes the form of a decline in
M
; and ;. Ignoring for the time being other shocks (c - c~ -~ -,Lr - D) - - -s -s
the solution for the relative price is, as shown in the Appendix.
1 ~ . .„
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(3.2.10)11
From equations ( 3.2.4) and (3.2.5) it can be deduced that
s ~ ..
P1-P2 - (pl-P2) ' (T-~ ) (j.2.11)
Combining these results the following proposition may be stated.
Proposition 3. If labour supply is endogenous the country where monopolis-
tic competition is relatively weaker realizes higher terms of trade than
under perfect competition for realistic values of the parameters.
N
To substantiate this proposition it should be noted first that as ~, ~ ~
.
1 it is reasonable to assume ~;~ ~ 1. The production function exhibits
decreasing returns, which implies p( 1 and e C 1. Now if the elasticity
of labour supply (v) is also smaller than one the sign of (pl-p2) corres-
. ~w
ponds to the sign of (;-~ ). Therefore, if monopolistic competition leads
.~ . .~ .
to a higher profit margin abroad we have ~(;( 0 and pl - p2 ~ 0.
What is at stake can easily be explained. The domestic country
benefits from the higher profit margins abroad through trade. However,
higher profit margins abroad induce a larger reduction in supply of the
foreign good compared with the decline in supply at home. This leads to a
rise of the relative price of the foreign good, counteracting the first
mentioned effect. As stated above the second effect will be smaller for
realistic parameter values, especially with regard to labour supply.
3.3 The impact of supply and demand shocks
. .~
It should be observed that under monopolistic competition ;-; -0
A
unless the elasticities of demand ~, and n are a function of other varia-
bles, for instance the number of firms or total demand. However, as alrea-
dy discussed by Chamberlin (1933) there is no clear reason why these elas-
ticities should vary in a systematic manner with the number of firms. As
Chamberlin puts it: "More substitutes does not necessarily mean better
substitutes in a sense which would increase elasticities" (Ibid., p.286).
Layard and Nickell (1985) hold a different view. In their opinion the
elasticity n depends positively on aggregate demand, because oligopolistic12
firms reduce the mark-up over marginal cost in booms. We will not follow
this argumentation, which seems typical ad-hoc. - ~
For constant values of n and ~ the log-linear version of the
model under monopolistic competition looks formally the same as the log-
linear version under perfect competition. However, the original versions
of the models lead to different solutions which is reflected in different
values for a number of elasticity coefficients. Apart from this the market
structure is important with respect to the transmission of shocks. The
stories to be told are different. It is therefore instructive to analyse
the impact of supply shocks and demand shocks in the present model.
Equilibrium in the goods market and the labour market in the do-
mestic country implies s relation between the relative commodity price and
the rate of interest. This relation is derived in the Appendix.
~(P1-P2) - -~rtuc?(1-u)c`-1~ ~s
There is a similar relation for market equilibrium abroad.
M . . . r.M r . ,~
~ (P1-P2) - ~r-u c -(1-k )cfi-~ ~s
Solving for the relative price gives:






Turning to autonomous changes in labour supply first, the follo-
wing proposition summarizes the result expressed in equation (3-3-3)-
.~
Proposition 4. A positive supply shock in the foreign countrv (~ ~ 0)
-s
raises the terms of trade of the domestic countrv. The real rate of inte-
rest declines to eliminate excess suoplv of goods on both markets.
A graphical illustration of this proposition is presented in Figure 1. A
positive supply shock translates into a downward shift of the marginal
cost curve of foreign (discriminating) monopolists. This may occur direct-
ly (in the case of a technological improvement) or indirectly as the wagei3
rate falls in the case of excess supply in the labour market. Foreign
firms lower their prices and sell more in both markets. Domestic firms
lose ground because of a more severe import competition. Labour demand in
the domestic economy declines which puts a downward pressure on wages.
Labour supply increases siuultaneously, because the real wage rate (w~pc)
rises as the price of imported goods declines. When domestic wages fall
producers in the home country can fight back by lowering their prices and
increasing output. Excess supply of goods is distributed internationally.
A reduction in the real interest rate then becomes necessary to restore
equilibrium in both markets.2) The relative price of the foreign good




Figure 1: Positive supply shock abroad.
A demand shock in one country leads to a shift of the market equi-
librium curves of both countries as shown in Figures 2a and 2b. The main
implications of a demand shock are summarized in the following proposi-
tion.
2) In a model with capital accumulation a supply shock may affect the
marginal efficiency of capital. Under these circumstances the interest
rate may rise as shown for instance in Van de Klundert (1986).14
.
Proposition 5. A positive demand shock in the foreign countrv (c ~ 0)
leads to a deterioration of the terms of trade in the domestic countrv if
M
there exists a"home market bias" (u ~ 1-u ). The real interest rate pri-
ses to choke off excess demand.
w
The meaning of the condition u) 1-u is straightforward. The inequality
states that there is a"home market bias" such that the share of domestic
firms exceeds the share of foreign firms in the home market when the coun-
tries are equal in size. A demand pull will then have a stronger effect on
the consumption of the domestic good than on the imported good in the
country where the shock applies. A similar condition is reported in
Venables (1985), where a Cournot model is applied to explain intrasector
trade. Under the condition stated above output in the foreign country
rises, while output in the domestic country falls. Branson and Rotenberg
(1980) also note the possibility of an opposite outcome and call it the
"Hong Kong" case. In their view it is related to the market structure of
monopolistic competition. However, a demand pull in one country raises
output in the other country when there is s"foreign market bias" whatever
w
its cause. The outcomes for u and N depend on the relative size of coun-
tries and on the solution for relative prices. It is through the latter
effect that the market structure will be of influence. The different pos-
sibilities are illustrated in Figure 2a for the normal case and in Figure










Figure 2a: Positive demand Figure 2b: Positive demand
shock abroad; normal case shock abroad; "Hong Kong" case15
The result of a demand pull can be explained as follows. On impact
of a positive shock abroad firms operating in the foreign market raise
their price and their output. There will be excess demand in all markets.
The rate of interest rises to choke off demand for goods. Wages increase
to restore equilibrium in the labovr market. Prices in both countries
rise. For K) 1-u the terms of trade of the foreign country improve.
implying an increase in the supply of labour and the volume of output. In
the home country labour supply and output decrease.
4. Conclusions
Price discriminating monopolists may drive a wedge between the
relative price of commodities and the terms of trade or real exchange rate
in a macroeconomic two-country model. In the present analysis monopolistic
competition relates to product differentiation. The higher the elasticity
of substitution between goods the lower profit margins will be. Zn this
sense competition is less severe. When the elasticity of substitution
differs across countries the terms of trade of the region where monopolis-
tic competition is less severe will be higher than under perfect competi-
tion. If labour supply is endogenous output will be lower in both coun-
tries.
A positive supply shock in the foreign country raises the terms of
trade of the domestic country (real exchange rate depreciation). A positi-
ve demand shock in the foreign country leads to a deterioration of the
terms of trade at home (real exchange rate appreciation), if there is a
"home market bias". Output in the domestic country declines. In the oppo-
site case of a"foreign market bias" a demand pull abroad raises output in
the domestic economy.
The model is kept rather simple and could be extended in several
directions. Nominal wage rigidity as well as real wage could be introduced
to study problems of unemployment. The microeconomic foundations of the
model would gain by analysing intertemporal choice of consumers and produ-
cers. Fixed cost could be assumed to explain the number of firms on long-
term. However, this would not fundamentally change the conclusions of the
present analysis.16
Appendix
From equations (3.2.3) and (3.2.4) labour demand can be written as:
~ - -É(w-P1)tÉT--É(w-pc-(1-O)(P1-P2)).É3'
Equilibrium in the labour market in the domestic country implies
w-pC - liEOL(pl-p2)~}1~EL~-1~EU ~S
Substitution of this result in (3.2.7) gives
~ - 1fEYO (pl-p2)}SUEL~}1tEL ~S
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Substitution of equations (A.3), (A.4) and (A.5) in the equilibrium rela-
tion for the goods market in the domestic country results in
L 1tEYo t ,~n(1-o).(1-u)nwow](P1-P2) - -Lu~~(1-u)~~]r
} uC~ (1-lt)Cw-1~,Cs-1~~ (A.6)
A similar expression can be derived for equilibrium in the goods market in
the foreign country:
a s
S L(1-O) r r a w - ~ r s a .
C . . f N n. (1-0 ).(1-N )no]lP2-pl)--[~ ~ t(1-~ )~]r
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1tE v s 1.E v17
The solution for the relative commodity price follows from equations (A.6) w r s w
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